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DUET OF DISCORD:
MARTHA GRAHAM AND HER NON-PROFIT
BATTLE OVER WORK FOR HIRE
I. OVERTURE -INTRODUCTION
According to the Second Circuit, Martha Graham, an icon in the
world of choreography and beyond, does not own the copyright to most of
her masterpieces.' This may be shocking to some, especially artists, who
often presume that as the creator of a work they are also the owners of its
copyright. While artists may be deprived of their rights in a work for hire
arrangement,2 Graham's situation draws attention to a more complex issue.
Many artists like Graham have turned to non-profit organizations to
support them in their artistic endeavors. Graham was under the employ of
a non-profit organization created solely to support and benefit her creative
achievements. However, what may have seemed like an ideal arrangement
at the time has now left the copyrights to many of Graham's
choreographies with the non-profit organization rather than her estate.
The Second Circuit ruled in Martha Graham School and Dance
Foundation, Inc. v. Martha Graham Center of Contemporary Dance, Inc.
that Graham never owned the rights to some of her legendary modem
dances. Although Graham is regarded as on par with some of the most
celebrated artists of our time, the court paid little heed to her status when
determining the copyright ownership of her work. Instead, the court ruled
that the Martha Graham Center of Contemporary Dance (the "Center"), a
non-profit entity formed to benefit and support Graham, and for which
Graham worked as Program Director and later as Artistic Director, owned
the copyright. The court, based on the doctrine of work for hire,
concluded that because Graham created the dances while she worked as a
1. Martha Graham Sch. and Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary
Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624, 628 (2d Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Graham I1].
2. See 17 U.S.C. §101 (2000) (defining work for hire as "(1) a work prepared by an
employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or
commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work" in certain enumerated situations).
3. Graham 111, 380 F.3d at 628.
4. See Anna Kisselgoff, Martha Graham Dies at 96; A Revolutionary in Dance, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 2, 1991, at Al.
5. Graham II, 380 F.3d at 628.
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salaried employee, her choreographies belonged to the Center.6 The dance
community's initial outrage with the Second Circuit's decision stems from
the fact that, traditionally, if a work is created at the employer's instance,
recommendation, and under the employer's supervision, then it is a work
for hire.7 Using this guideline, it is difficult for those familiar with
Graham's talents to fathom that without the Center's instance she would
have failed to choreograph her famed works. In response to the Second
Circuit's reasoning, Charles Reinhart, the director of the American Dance
Festival and co-author of an amicus curiae brief supporting the plaintiff,
retorted that "[t]o think Martha is for hire is like the pope saying to the
devil, 'Come to dinner.' 8
Although there is virtually no precedent dealing with the work for
hire doctrine as applied to a non-profit organization created entirely for an
artist's benefit, this matter deserves careful consideration. Given the
increase in artists creating non-profits to support their art, the issue
presented in Graham's case is not a rarity and is bound to become a
reoccurring problem for the courts.9 In its analysis, the court ignored the
fact that as a non-profit, the Center's objective was to promote, and not
obtain, art on behalf of the organization. 0 This key distinction highlights
the contradictory goals of for-profits and non-profits. As non-profits serve
different needs than for-profit corporations, the court must scrutinize the
type of the organization. The court's assumption that the employer-
employee relationship is the same for both types of organizations is
misguided, and the uniform application of the work for hire doctrine does
not best reflect each organization's goals.
Should appellant successfully appeal to the Supreme Court, Judd
Burstein, the lawyer for the plaintiff-appellant, should draw attention to the
current split among the circuits in the application of work for hire."
Furthermore, he should argue that when non-profits are created to support
an individual artist, "the presumption should be that the artist maintains
6. Id.
7. See id. at 634-35.
8. Felicia R. Lee, Graham Legacy, on the Stage Again; The Heir's Determination Is
Unabated After a Second Court Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2004, at El.
9. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Dance Festival, Inc., Mr. Gerald Arpino and
Mr. Gordon Davidson, In Support of Plaintiff's Appellants at 3-6, Martha Graham Sch. And
Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir.
2004) (No. 02-9451(L)) (explaining how artists must rely on non-profit support to fund their
projects).
10. See id. at 9 (highlighting that when for-profit organizations commission work, it is to
benefit the corporation, where as non-profits are exclusively trying to benefit the artist).
11. Lee, supra note 8.
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ownership of the work and they are not works for hire."' 12  Such a
presumption would best reflect the purpose of non-profits while
maintaining the general principle that the creator retains the rights to his or
her work.
13
Before deconstructing the Second Circuit's decision, Part II of this
Note offers a background on relevant copyright law. It will briefly trace
the historical relationship between copyright law and choreography, as well
as analyze how courts have applied work for hire under both the 1909 and
1976 Copyright Acts. Part III provides the specific factual background to
this case, followed by a description of the procedural history in Part IV.
Part V analyzes the court's flawed application of work for hire to a non-
profit entity and finds that this reasoning is in direct conflict with Supreme
Court precedent. Additionally, this section sets forth a recommendation for
a creative arts policy that supports the original intent behind work for hire
and safeguards the artist's interest. Finally, Part VI concludes that the
Second Circuit erred in finding that the Center, irrelevant of its non-profit
status, owns the rights to Graham's dances under work for hire.
II. BACKGROUND ON COPYRIGHT LAW
A. Copyright Law and Choreography
The United States Constitution provides the basis for copyright law
by granting Congress the power to "[p]romote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Investors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.' 4 However,
courts have not always viewed choreography, the art of creating a dance, as
an art worthy of federal protection.15 Common law copyright first applied
to choreography in the nineteenth century. 16  These early decisions
illustrate the courts' general reluctance to extend copyright protection to
12. Id.
13. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (evidencing the general presumption and principle of Copyright
Law that the creator is the owner of his or her work).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
15. See, e.g., Fuller v. Bemis, 50 F. 926, 929 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1892) (denying recovery to
choreographer because infringed stage dance was not copyrightable as it lacked apparent story or
characters); Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920, 922 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867) (No. 9,173) (denying
copyright protection because the work consisted of scant dialogue accompanied by ballet-like
movements).
16. Adaline J. Hilgard, Note, Can Choreography and Copyright Waltz Together in the Wake
ofHorgan v. Macmillan, Inc.?, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 757, 761 (1994).
2005]
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dance.' 7
1. Choreography Under the 1909 Copyright Act
Under the 1909 Copyright Act, although choreography was not
explicitly protected, it could be registered as part of a "dramatic
composition."'18 To classify a dance as a dramatic composition, the piece
must have a bona fide plot or story told by characters. 19 As a result,
abstract or experimental dances choreographed before January 1, 1978
received virtually no protection. 0
2. Choreography under the 1976 Copyright Act
In response to an increased popularity of choreography in film,
television, and theater, it became necessary for legislators to create a
specific category of protection for dance. 21  To that end, the 1976
Copyright Act collectively lists "pantomimes and choreographic works" as
an independent genre deserving of full protection.22 By defining the
category this way, rather than as "dramatic compositions," the legislators
sought to expand the scope of the Act to include modem dance and other
works which lacked a traditional storyline. 3 While the 1976 Act no longer
necessitated that dances have plots or tell stories, it limited protection by
requiring a work to be both original and fixed. By not explicitly defining
the terms "originality" or "choreographic work", the legislators have left
the door open for varying interpretations of what constitutes copyrightable
dance.
Horgan v. Macmillan, Inc. ,24 a landmark decision in the copyright and
choreography field, is an example of the confusion which arises absent a
clear and uniform definition for choreographic works. In Horgan, the
estate of choreographer George Balanchine sued Macmillan, a publisher,
17. See Fuller, 50 F. at 929; Martinetti, 16 F. Cas. at 922.
18. Seltzer v. Sunbrock, 22 F. Supp. 621, 629 (S.D. Cal. 1938) (explaining the courts'
refusal in the 1909 Act to classify a work as a dramatic composition if it lacks a plot).
19. Borge Varmer, Study No. 28 Copyright in Choreographic Works, October 1959, in
STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 93, 95-96 (Copyright Soc'y of the U.S.A. ed., 1963).
20. See id.
21. See id. at 94.
22. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(4) (2000). The 1976 Copyright Act applies to work created after or
on January 1, 1978. Id.
23. See Varmer, supra note 19, at 101 (explaining that modem dance deserves protection
because it is an original work of authorship, and even if"no 'story' may be readily evident.., the
dance movements are expected to convey some thematic or emotional concept to the audience").
24. Horgan v. Macmillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1986).
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for copyright infringement.25 Macmillan published a book that featured
still photographs of dancers performing Balanchine's version of the
Nutcracker ballet.26 The district court reasoned that the photographs did
not constitute copyright infringement because they depicted "dancers in
various attitudes at specific instants of time," rather than "the flow of the
steps in a ballet," and, thus, "[t]he staged performance could not be
recreated" from the photographs. 7 The Second Circuit overruled the
district court's limited understanding of choreography, concluding that
even "a single moment in a dance sequence may communicate a great
deal."28
The second major addition to the 1976 Act, the requirement for
fixation, has proved trying in actual application. Due to the live,
performance-driven nature of dance, it is a more difficult medium to fix
than a static form such as a novel or painting.29 As a result, courts have
accepted different methods of fixation including dance notation, film, and
computer software. 30 By fixing the work, a copyright owner gains the legal
and exclusive right to reproduce the works, to create derivative works, and
to perform the work in public.31
B. The Work for Hire Doctrine
The choreographer's mere creation of a work does not guarantee
copyright ownership. Work for hire is an exception to the general rule that
the person who creates the work is the author. Under this exception, the
employer-be it a firm, organization, or individual, rather than the
employee-is deemed to be the author of the work.3 3 The roots of this
doctrine can be traced to the common law of the early twentieth century,
25. Id. at 158.
26. Id.
27. See id. at 160 (citing Horgan v. Macmillan, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1169, 1170 (S.D.N.Y.
1985)).
28. Id. at 163.
29. Leslie Erin Wallis, The Different Art: Choreography and Copyright, 33 UCLA L. REV.
1442, 1456 (1986).
30. Krystina Lopez de Quintana, Comment, The Balancing Act: How
Copyright and Customary Practices Protect Large Dance Companies Over
Pioneering Choreographers, 11 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 139, 150
(2004).
31. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
32. See United States Copyright Office, Works Made for Hire Under the 1976 Copyright
Act, Circular 9 (Dec. 2004), available at http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ09.pdf (explaining
17 U.S.C. § 101).
33. Id.
2005]
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when the presumption was that unless contracted to the contrary, the
employer of an artist owned the copyright to the artist's works.34
Supporters of this doctrine offer the rationale that "the product of
employment should ordinarily belong to the employer" as this is "the result
that would usually be brought about by contract or trade custom."
35
However, the concept is commonly criticized for creating an artificial
designation because it is the actual creator who is "intended to be the
primary beneficiary of the copyright.
36
Despite this criticism, the Supreme Court adopted this common law
precept in 1903 because of its supposed simplicity and definiteness.37 In
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., the first Supreme Court case to
apply the principle, the Court held that the employer owned the copyright
to advertisements created by its paid employee as the works were created in
the course and scope of employment.38  Later, Congress codified the
common law principle in the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts.39  To
determine which act applies to artistic works, courts follow the Ninth
Circuit and look to the date of creation.40
1. Work for Hire Under the 1909 Copyright Act
The 1909 Copyright Act includes an employer within its definition of
"author." 41 As a result, as long as the employer files a timely application,
the employer owns the original term and renewal copyrights to its
employee's creation.42 Unfortunately, the Act was silent as to which
employer-employee relationship qualified under the work for hire doctrine,
leaving courts to fill the void.43
Under the 1909 Act, absent express contractual language, courts
34. See Diane C. H. McNamara, Preserving the Creator's Right of Authorship to Works
Made for Hire, 7 A.B.A. F. ENT. AND SPORTS INDUSTRIES 1, 2 (1989).
35. Borge Varmer, Study No. 13 Works Made for Hire and On Commission, April 1958, in
STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 127, 139 (Copyright Soc'y of the U.S.A. ed., 1963).
36. Id.
37. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 248 (1903).
38. Id.
39. McNamara, supra note 34, at 2.
40. ALEXANDER LINDEY & MICHAEL LANDAU, LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING
AND THE ARTS § 1.4 (2d ed. 2004) (citing Wilkes v. Rhino Records, Inc., 133 F.3d 931 (9th Cir.
1997)) (holding that artwork created for a regional musical festival that took place in 1966-67
was governed by the 1909 Act even though the infringement occurred after January 1, 1978).
41. 17 U.S.C. § 26 (revised 1976).
42. See 17 U.S.C. § 23 (revised 1976).
43. McNamara, supra note 34, at 2 (citing Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1096
(9th Cir. 1989)).
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generally use the "instance and expense test" to determine if a work is a
work for hire.44 This test applies when the employer is the catalyst for a
work's creation and has the right to direct and supervise the project
throughout the creative process.45 However, some courts have extended
this rule in favor of the employer and do not require that the employer
actually direct and supervise the creation for it to be deemed a work for
hire.46 Further, if the parties' intent cannot be determined, the courts
presume that ownership vests in the employer. This presumption is based
on the belief that absent the employer's motivation and furnishing of
resources, the work would not have been created.47
In Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., the court
interpreted the test to apply to both traditional employees and independent
48contractors. Any work the employee creates outside the scope of his or
her normal duties is not considered to be a work for hire.49 In response to
the limited guidance offered by the 1909 Act and the varying
interpretations that resulted, Congress decided to clarify its original intent
for the doctrine in the 1976 Copyright Act.
2. Work for Hire Under the 1976 Copyright Act
To reduce confusion, the 1976 Copyright Act expressly identifies
work for hire and distinguishes between independent contractors and
traditional employees.50 The statute defines the concept either as "a work
prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment;" or,
depending on the medium, "a work specially ordered or commissioned." 51
This limitation was a Congressional attempt to offer more protection to the
44. See Graham III., 380 F.3d at 634 (under the instance and expense
test "the copyright shall be... at whose instance and expense the
work is done."); see also Graham IX., 380 F.3d at 634 and n.17
(citing Nimmer on Copyright § 238 (1964) (explaining when to apply the
instance and expense test)).
45. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir. 1995).
46. See Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F. 2d 497, 500-01 (2d Cir. 1969).
47. Brattleboro Publ'g Co. v. Winmill Publ'g Corp., 369 F.2d 565, 568 (2d Cir. 1966).
48. Id.
49. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 221 F.2d 569, 570 (2d Cir. 1955)
(holding that when an employee wrote lyrics for a song that was outside the scope of his
employment, he owned the author's right to the lyrics, subject to the terms of his contract).
50. 17 U.S.C. §101 (2000) (defining work for hire).
51. Id. To reduce the instances in which an independent contractor would be subject to work
for hire, Congress created nine categories where work is considered to be a work for hire. These
categories are (1) a contribution to collective work, (2) a part of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, (3) a translation, (4) a supplementary work, (5) a compilation, (6) an
instructional text, (7) a test, (8) answer material for a test and (9) an atlas. Id.
20051
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employee.52 As such, a new presumption emerged that an independent
contractor is deemed the author unless one of the listed exceptions
applies.53 Additionally, the 1976 Act benefits artists because it shifts the
burden to their employers by requiring them to include contractual
language regarding copyright ownership.54 Although the new Act provided
some needed guidance, the statute was unclear as to how exactly the court
should apply this concept to the traditional employer-employee
relationship.
In the face of this ambiguity, four interpretations of employer-
employee type of work for hire emerged.55 The first approach, which
echoed the 1909 Act, turned on whether the hiring party retains the right to
control the product. 56 A second approach, created by the Second Circuit
and followed by the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, focused on whether the
hiring party actually wielded control over the creation of the work.57 A
third tactic used the common law agency definition to identify an
employee. Support for this approach is found in the Act's use of "scope of
employment," a term of art frequently used in agency law.58 A fourth
minority approach designated a party as an employee only if he or she is
salaried. 9
The Supreme Court first interpreted works for hire under the 1976
Act in the 1989 case Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid
(hereinafter "CCNV'). 60  In CCNV, a non-profit association formed to
eliminate homelessness hired sculptor Earl Reid to create "Third World
America," a display depicting the local homeless population.61 The
52. See Graham I1, 380 F.3d at 635-36 n.20 (citing Jessica D. Litman, Copyright,
Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 889 (1987)).
53. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (listing the exceptions for when a work is a work for hire
rather than an independent commission).
54. Michael B. Landau, "Works Made for Hire" After Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid: The Need for Statutory Reform and the Importance of the Contract, 9 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 107, 146 (1990) (resulting in the requirement that a writing must evidence a
transfer of copyright, otherwise copyright vests with the creator).
55. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 738-739 (1989) (detailing the
four judicial interpretations of work for hire under the 1976 Copyright Act) [hereinafter CCN,].
56. See Peregrine v. Lauren Corp., 601 F. Supp. 828, 829 (Colo. 1985); Clarkstown v.
Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
57. See Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 553 (2d Cir. 1984);
Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas Pub'g Co., 810 F.2d 410,413 (4th Cir. 1987); Evans
Newton, Inc. v. Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889, 894 (7th Cir. 1986).
58. CCNV, 490 U.S. at 740.
59. See Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d at 1093, 1105 (9th Cir. 1989).
60. See CCNV, 490 U.S. at 730.
61. See id. at 733-34.
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Community for Creative Non-Violence ("CCNV") claimed it owned the
copyright to the sculpture because it was a work for hire.
62
In determining whether Reid's art was a work for hire, the Supreme
Court rejected the notion that the hiring party's right to control the creation
should be the determinative factor. 63 The Court reasoned that this approach
failed to promote the congressional goal in drafting the 1976 Act-to
enhance predictability and certainty of copyright ownership. 64 Instead, the
Court adopted common law agency principles to define employee because
this approach corresponded with original congressional intent.65 The Court
based its analysis on the Restatement of Agency factors.66 Under this
approach, the Court concluded that despite CCNV's initial development of
the premise for the sculpture, Reid was an independent contractor and
therefore retained copyright ownership of the piece.67 The Court classified
Reid as an independent contractor because he used his own equipment, in
68
his own workspace, and away from the direct supervision of CCNV.
Further, Reid's project was not a part of CCNV's regular business because,
as a non-profit, "CCNV is not a business at all."69
Following CCNV, lower courts began to apply the so-called "Reid
62. See id. at 738-39. In particular, CCNV supported their argument that the organization
provided the title for the sculpture, as well as the general design concept. Id.
63. Id. at 748.
64. Id. at 749 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 129 (1976)).
65. Id. at 740-41.
66. CCNV, 490 U.S. at 751-52; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958)
(The agency factors include:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the [hiring party] may exercise
over the details of the work; (b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a
distinct occupation or business; (c) the kind of occupation, with reference to
whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the
employer or by a specialist without supervision; (d) the skill required in the
particular occupation; (e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work; (f) the
length of time for which the person is employed; (g) the method of payment,
whether by the time or by the job; (h) whether or not the work is a part of the
regular business of the employer; (i) whether or not the parties believe they are
creating the relation of master and servant; and () whether the principal is or is not
in business);
see also Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1992) (ruling that the Second Circuit
affords specific attention to "(1) the hiring party's right to control the manner and means of
creation; (2) the skill required; (3) provision of employee benefits; (4) the tax treatment of the
hired party; and (5) whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired
party.").
67. CCNV, 490 U.S. at 752-53.
68. Id. at 752.
69. Id. at 753.
2005]
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factors," which borrow notions from agency law. 70 Despite providing the
lower courts with a set of factors, many believe that Congress needs to
rewrite the Copyright statute because the agency definition of an
"employee" is too broad for the fact-specific work for hire analysis.7'
III. CASE FACTS
A. Martha Graham
As a dancer and choreographer, Martha Graham's "name became
synonymous with modem dance. 7 2  Dancers around the globe revered
Graham for her "inventive style which provided a welcome alternative to
the preponderance of classical ballet., 73  However, recognition of her
immense talent was not limited to fellow artists, as the mainstream also
embraced her and christened her as one of the century's most important
people.74
Despite her death in 1991, Graham's legacy remains a powerful force
in the dance world and the majority of her masterpieces "have never been
extensively restaged or redesigned., 75  Fiercely protective of her work,
Graham allowed very few dance companies to perform her repertoire
during her lifetime. 76  Preferring the avant-garde early in her career,
Graham elected to forgo association with an established dance company or
working in the commercial theater world in order to teach and develop her
own unique style.77
B. The Creation of the Center
In the late 1920s, Graham, eager to impart her specific vision to
others, formed a dance company consisting of a few female dancers.
7
Although artistically fulfilling, financing the company proved to be
70. LINDEY, supra note 40, § 1.4. Hereinafter the "Reid factors" will be referred to as Reid
factors.
71. See, e.g., McNamara, supra note 34, at 18 (supporting a more individualized approach to
work for hire which eliminates the need for the supervision and direction).
72. Kisselgoff, supra note 4, at Al.
73. Id.
74. Terry Teachout, Martha Graham, TIME, June 8, 1998, at 200 (including Graham in its
list of the 20th Century's 100 Most Important People).
75. Lewis Segal, In Thrall to a Phantom, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2003, at E46.
76. Id.
77. Kisselgoff, supra note 4, at B7.
78. Id.
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difficult. Since the dancers had to support themselves, they spent the
majority of their time earning revenue from tours and recitals, leaving only
a fraction of the year to create new works.79 In 1930, Graham expanded
her small company to include a dance school, which she ran as a sole
proprietorship until 1956.80 However, Graham's attention was once again
divided between staying afloat financially and pursuing her artistic
endeavors. As a result, to free herself from funding and legal headaches
and to be eligible for tax benefits, Graham began to rely on non-profit
corporations to fund her ventures in the 1940s.81 In 1948, the Center was
incorporated. 82  Following suit, the Martha Graham School of
Contemporary Dance ("the School") was incorporated in 1956.83 The
School and the Center operated as one entity and the court treated them as
such because they shared the same board of directors and facilities, and
maintained combined bank accounts. 84 During this time, the Center and
other non-profits supported Graham by "promoting and disseminating her
technique and by raising and managing funds for performances. 8 5
C. Graham's Employment with the Center
In 1956, Graham sold her sole proprietorship to the School.86 At this
time, she entered into a ten-year, part-time employment agreement with the
School to serve as its Program Director.8 7 The contract obligated Graham
to provide the School annually with "one-third of her professional time.
Her contractual duties included teaching and overseeing the educational
program, but not choreographing. 89  Graham was able to continue
choreographing while teaching due to funding from other non-profits. 90 In
1966, the school extended Graham's contract for another ten years and
appointed her Artistic Director, with new duties, including maintaining the
repertory, rehearsing the company, creating new work and continuing to
79. Id.
80. Martha Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary
Dance, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) [hereinafter Graham I1].
81. Graham III, 380 F.3d at 629.
82. Id. (The Center was initially known as the Martha Graham Foundation for
Contemporary Dance, Inc.).
83. Id.
84. Graham II, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 572.
85. Graham III, 380 F.3d at 637.
86. Id. at 629.
87. Id. at 637.
88. Id. at 638.
89. Id.
90. See id.
2005]
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supervise the School.9' The Center maintains that during this time there
was an unspoken understanding between the board of directors and Graham
that any new work created became the organization's property and
responsibility.92 With her contract renewed again in 1976, Graham
remained the Artistic Director and Chief Executive of the School and
Center until her death in 1991.9'
D. The Effect of Graham's Will and Death upon the Center's Operation
In the late 1960s, Graham developed a close relationship with
photographer Ronald Protas.9 4  He became Graham's trusted confidante
and spokesperson. 95 In 1972, Protas became an employee of the Center,
which appointed him to Co-Associate Artistic Director in 1980.96 With no
children or spouse, Graham decided to name Protas as the executor of her
estate.97 In her final will, she bequeathed him the rights and interests to her
"dance works, musical scores, scenery sets, [Graham's] personal papers
and the use of [Graham's] name. 98 In the event that Protas did not survive
her, the will left these rights to the Center.99
Following Graham's death, Protas replaced Graham as the Center's
Artistic Director.'00 In 1998, he created the Martha Graham Trust ("the
Trust"), in which he placed the copyrights to Graham's intellectual
property without any questioning from the Center's board as to his
ownership.' 0 ' Shortly thereafter, "Protas, acting through the Trust, founded
the [non-profit] Martha Graham School and Dance Foundation ("S&D
Foundation")."'' 0 2 The Trust licensed Graham's dances to many licensees
and in 1999 gave the Center "an exclusive license to teach the Martha
Graham technique, and a non-exclusive license to present live
performances" of her work. 103 As a condition of this agreement, Protas
would remain a salaried employee of the Center but no longer serve as
91. Graham II, 224 F. Supp.2d at 573.
92. Id.
93. Graham III, 380 F.3d at 639.
94. Id. at 629.
95. Id.
96. Graham II, 224 F. Supp. at 574; Graham I1, 380 F.3d at 629.
97. Graham III, 380 F.3d at 629.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 629-30 n.3.
100. Id. at 630.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Graham IIl, 380 F.3d at 630.
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Artistic Director.1°4 In 2000, following a clash between Protas and the
Center's board regarding a mutually agreeable replacement, the Center was
forced to postpone operations due to financial difficulties.1
0 5
From 2000 to 2001, Protas and the Center each separately obtained
the copyright certificates of registration for the same thirty dances
choreographed by Graham. 0 6 The S&D Foundation was the exclusive
American licensee for performances of Graham's choreography and use of
the Martha Graham trademark. 0 7 In 2001, the Center received financial
support and was able to reopen.108  Although its financial woes had
disappeared, the Center directed its energy towards legal concerns as Protas
filed suit seeking to enjoin the Center and School from using the Martha
Graham trademark, teaching her style, and performing her choreography.
Further, Protas sought a judgment declaring that the Trust owned the rights
to all of Graham's dances, and the sets and jewelry associated with these
works.' 09
IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Graham's Works in Dispute
At issue in this case is the ownership of the seventy dances created
and fixed by Graham. Both the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts apply
because Graham choreographed before and after January 1, 1978.'"' Work
for hire is vital to determining ownership of her works. Hence, whether the
Center employed Graham and what position she held is crucial to the
court's analysis.
The 1909 Copyright Act applies to fifty-five of the dances."'
Graham created thirty-six of these works while she ran her dance school as
a sole proprietorship."12 She created ten works while employed by the
Center as the Program Director of the School. 1 3 Graham completed nine
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Graham 11, 380 F.3d at 631.
110. Id. at 632-33.
111. See id. at 637-40.
112. Id. at 637.
113. Id.
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dances while serving as the Artistic Director of the Center."' 4 The 1976
Copyright Act applies to Graham's final works, including fifteen
choreographies completed from 1978 to 1991, while she continued to serve
as the Artistic Director of the Center." '
B. The Decision of the Southern District of New York
The primary issues before the district court were Protas' allegations
that the Center had infringed the trademark and was not the copyright
owner of Graham's dances.'16 The court approached each issue in separate
opinions." 7 As to the trademark issues, the court ruled that the agreement
granting the Center the license to dances from the Trust never took effect,
therefore licensee estoppel did not preclude the Center from obtaining
relief."18
The majority of the controversy and the focus of this Note is to
determine whether Graham owned the copyrights to her dances. The
district court ruled that of Graham's seventy dances the Center owned the
copyright to forty-five dances, while Protas's S&D Foundation owned the
copyright for one dance." 19 To reach its holding of work for hire, the court
applied the instance and expense test to the dances created under the 1909
Copyright Act 120 and the Reid factors to the later dances made under the
1976 Act. 12  Regarding the remaining work, the court ruled that ten of the
dances were in the public domain and nine were not published with the
required notice. Additionally, for five of the works, neither side had met
the burden for proving the commissioner intended for Graham to reserve
the copyright. 122
114. Id. at 639.
115. See Graham 111, 380 F.3d at 641.
116. See Graham 1H, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 607-09 (The Center also filed a counterclaim
advancing that Protas had breached his fiduciary duty to the non-profit. The court ruled that by
misrepresenting the ownership rights of Graham's works, Protas "violated his duty of good faith
and profited improperly at defendants' expense.").
117. See id. at 569 (determining who owned the copyright to Graham's works); Martha
Graham Sch. & Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 153 F.
Supp. 2d 512, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (determining whether the Center and School had infiinged the
Martha Graham trademark) [hereinafter Graham 1].
118. See Graham I, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 512.
119. See Graham II, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 570.
120. Id. at 588-90.
121. Id. at 591.
122. Id. at 570.
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C. The Decision of the Court ofAppeals for the Second Circuit
On appeal, Protas contended that the district court's decision was
erroneous because none of Graham's dances was work for hire. 12 3 The
Second Circuit affirmed most of the district court's opinion, holding that
the majority of Graham's choreographies were work for hire and, therefore,
belonged to the Center.' 24 However, the court reversed the district court's
decision as to the works created between 1956 and 1965.125 The court
found that they were not work for hire because of Graham's status as a
part-time employee during this period. 26  The court also reversed the
ownership of the dance Acrobats of God to Protas since he owned the
renewal term.1 27 Finally, the court remanded the case to the district court to
determine ownership for seven dances between 1956 and 1965 because two
were incorrectly cited as unpublished.
28
V. ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S APPLICATION OF THE WORK
FOR HIRE DOCTRINE
A. The Court Inconsistently Applied the Instance and Expense Test
Although facially Graham's promotion as the Center's Artistic
Director appeared to have little impact on her choreography, the Second
Circuit ruled otherwise. 29 The court applied the instance and expense test,
determining that Graham's choreography from 1966 to 1977 was work for
hire because of her new position. 13  However, the court utilized the same
test to determine that the dances created during Graham's term as Program
Director were not work for hire. 13 1  These contrasting conclusions
necessitate an analysis of the change, if any, in Graham's status between
1965 and 1966 to warrant a finding of work for hire and to reveal a
123. Graham III, 380 F.3d at 632. Protas also argued on appeal that the district court erred
in deeming that some of the dances were published, that the Center owned the theatrical property
associated with the dances, and that he breached his fiduciary duty to the Center. The Second
Circuit reaffirmed the district court's opinion with respect to the property ownership and breach
of duty. Id.
124. Id. at 637-42.
125. Id. at 637-39.
126. Id. at 637.
127. Id. at 647.
128. Id.
129. Graham I1, 380 F.3d at 639-40.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 637-39.
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potentially inconsistent application of the instance and expense test.
In its holding, the court relied heavily on Graham's shift from part-
time to full-time status as an indicator that she relinquished her copyright
ownership to the Center. 2 However, Graham's change in position merely
reflected the reality that smaller non-profits like the Center "are often
founded, staffed and run by a small number of individuals, who usually
serve as 'employees' of these groups.' 133 In order to keep the understaffed
Center financially viable, Graham had to "pitch in" and take on a full-time
position. 134 Despite her dual roles as employee and artist, Graham arguably
did not intend to change the nature of her creative process or her ownership
rights.
1. The Expense Prong
The Second Circuit's holding is troubling in part because under the
"expense" prong, the Center did not provide Graham with more resources
when she was Artistic Director than in her earlier post as Program
Director. 35  Under both positions, Graham had access to dancers and
rehearsal space, and yet as Program Director, her dances were not
considered work for hire. 13 6 Defending its holding, the court argued that
Graham's choreographies while Program Director "arguably satisfi[ed] the
'expense' component," but because they ultimately failed the instance
prong the dances were not works for hire. 137 This clarification does not
necessarily cure the potential inconsistencies in the court's decision,
though, as the court's use of "arguably" may be its concession to the
weakness of this argument. Further, the fact that the court even provided
this insight speaks to what appears to be an inconsistent application of the
expense prong.
The court claims that the expense prong is met for the time period in
question because the Center paid Graham a "salary specifically to create
the intellectual property.' 3 8 However, merely receiving a salary cannot be
determinative because Graham received a salary while functioning as
132. Id. at 639.
133. Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Dance Festival, Inc., Mr. Gerald Arpino and Mr. Gordon
Davidson, In Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 6, Martha Graham Sch. and Dance Found., Inc.
v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-
9451(L)).
134. Graham 11, 380 F.3d at 639.
135. See id. at 638.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 640.
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Program Director.' 39 Other than the salary the Center paid Graham to teach
and carry on general administrative duties, the Center seems to have
financially supported her exactly as it did before she was an employee and
running her dance school as a sole proprietor.
40
2. The Instance Prong
In addition to the employer funding the project, to qualify as a work
for hire, the employer must also insist or request that the work be
performed.' 4' Assuming that Graham choreographed her work at the
Center's expense as a salaried employee, it is difficult to comprehend how
the instance prong is met in light of Graham's central role at the Center.
42
The court dismissed appellant's argument that the dances were not created
at the Center's instance as "beside the point" because Graham would have
created the same work absent her employment with the Center. 43 The
court also refused to apply a particularized meaning of "instance,"
reasoning that often creative artists are expected to produce work without
their employer providing specific recommendations.' 44 While the offered
rationale may hold true for a more traditional relationship, it does not seem
as applicable to the arrangement at issue, when the non-profit organization
and its employee are as entwined as Graham and the Center. The court
declined to address the key issue of whether the Center motivated
Graham's creations or Graham motivated the Center's creation. Nothing
indicates the Center's influence on Graham's work increased when Graham
became Artistic Director. In fact, the Center did not stimulate Graham's
choreography any more than it did when she was the Center's Program
Director. Although the Center reportedly urged Graham to focus on
creating rather than teaching, this does not mean that it directed her to
choreograph. 45 Rather, this reiterated the very purpose of the non-profit:
to champion Graham's artistic projects. As a result, Graham's new
position in 1966 as Artistic Director did not significantly alter her
relationship with the Center enough to warrant that these dances be deemed
works for hire.
139. Id. at 639.
140. Graham I, 380 F.3d. at 637.
141. Graham IA 224 F. Supp. 2d at 588.
142. Graham III, 380 F.3d at 639.
143. Id. at 640.
144. Id. at 640-41.
145. Id, at 639.
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B. Application of the Reid Factors Support the Conclusion that Graham's
Choreographies Are Not Works For Hire
In its analysis of Graham's work under the 1976 Copyright Act, the
court applied the Reid factors to conclude that these creations were works
for hire. CCNV mandated that courts use the thirteen Reid factors taken
from agency law to determine whether someone qualifies as an employee
under the 1976 Act. 146  In choosing a multi-factor test over other
alternatives, the Supreme Court sought a flexible method to handle the
gamut of "work for hire" situations. The Second Circuit has afforded
specific attention to five factors, but no one factor is determinative.
47
However, depending on the particulars of each case, certain factors will be
more relevant. Although it is debatable whether the Reid factors are
suitable to analyze a non-profit, since they are the accepted standard the
Second Circuit must apply them correctly. 148 Admittedly two of the five
factors preferred by the Second Circuit-the provision of employment
benefits and the Center's tax treatment of Graham-evidence a work for
hire relationship.149 Nonetheless, four other Reid factors particularly
applicable to Graham's situation do not overwhelmingly support the
Second Circuit's holding; instead, they bolster the appellant's argument
that Graham's dances are not works for hire.
One of the Reid factors to which the Second Circuit pays particular
attention is "the hiring party's right to control the manner and means of
creation."' 150 In applying this factor, the court conceded that the Center
exercised hardly any control over Graham's work.' 5' Recycling logic from
its analysis of the works under the 1909 Act, the court reasoned that the
Center's lack of actual control may be justified because this is the type of
situation where the "employer would not normally exercise control over the
details" and the control, if any, "may be very attenuated."'' 52 By lowering
the threshold to this degree, the court's definition makes it nearly
impossible for an artist to rebut the employer's ownership. This
interpretation clearly favors the employer by extending deference to his or
her management style whenever the artist is particularly talented.
146. CCNV, 490 U.S. at 751-52.
147. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 861 (listing the five of the thirteen Reid factors the Second Circuit
focuses on).
148. See infra Part V.D. 1 (recommending that courts do not apply the Reid factors to their
analysis of work for hire in non-profits).
149. Aymes, 980 F.2d 861.
150. Id.
151. Graham I1, 380 F.3d at 642.
152. Id.
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However, even if minimal control is found, other factors must also weigh
in the Center's favor for Graham's dances to be deemed work for hire.
153
Another factor that appears to weigh against the Second Circuit's
decision categorizes how the parties characterize their relationship;
specifically "whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation
of master and servant." 154 In its brief, appellant describes Graham as
having "enormous influence" over the Center's board, and in turn, the
"directors served at the pleasure of Miss Graham" supporting "whatever
creative energies Martha Graham had." 155 While the very existence of a
board hints at a structural hierarchy used to keep Graham in check, in
practice, the relationship suggests that if anyone was the master it was
Graham. Graham arguably did not view the Center to be her master and
judging from appellant's description, albeit subjective, the board did not
conduct business under the guise that it was the choreographer's master.
Absent a master-servant relationship, it becomes a matter for the court to
conclude whether the Center possessed even minimal control over Graham.
Appellant's brief illustrated that the relationship between Graham and the
Center falls outside of the scope of what would be considered a work for
hire arrangement under the Reid factors.
A third factor ignored by the Second Circuit, is whether Graham's
choreography can be considered to be "part of the regular business of the
employer" in light of what the Center held out to be its purpose.) 6 When
Graham incorporated her school in 1948, the purpose expressed in the
certificate of incorporation was the "development of cultural education in
connection with those arts which function through the dance and the
stage."'157  This illustrates her vision that the organization emphasized
education rather than creation. When Graham sold her foundation in 1956
to the School and Center, the certificate of incorporation again highlighted
education, specifically the teaching of "the science and art of the dance" as
the key focus of the organization.1 58  In addition to the educational
programs, the Center also aimed "to compose, perform and demonstrate"
choreography, lending support to its assertion that Graham's choreography
153. Id. at 641.
154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(i) (1958).
155. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellants at 9, Martha Graham Sch. and Dance Found., Inc. v.
Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 2d 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 01-
9055).
156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(h) (1958).
157. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellants at 7, Martha Graham Sch. and Dance Found., Inc. v.
Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 2d 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 01-
9055).
158. Graham II, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 572.
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was within the scope of its business. 159 Arguably, the Center's regular
business was the teaching of Graham's technique, not the creation of new
works. Therefore, the court can view any composition created during this
time as created outside of the perimeters of the non-profit's purpose.
Finally, even if the choreography is within the Center's regular
activity, the question remains whether a non-profit meets the "Reid"
qualification of being "in business."'' 60 As discussed later in this article, the
non-profit status is crucial to the Second Circuit's analysis.' 61 Because
Graham's dual roles in the organization blur the traditional employer-
employee relationship, the Court must look closely at the nature of the
organization in reaching its conclusion, as the Reid factors do not provide a
clear answer.
C. The Court Failed to Weigh the Center's Non-Profit Status
In its amicus curiae brief, the American Dance Federation ("ADF")
advised the Second Circuit to treat work for hire situations involving non-
profits "formed [solely] for the purpose of encouraging and supporting
authors in their creative endeavors" differently than for-profit
organizations. 162 The ADF recommended adopting a default rule allowing
the copyright to remain with the artist, not the non-profit. 63 Despite the
merits of ADF's brief, the court rejected ADF's suggestion, delegating the
issue to Congress.' 64 Burstein, the attorney for Graham's heir, appeared
stunned by the court's logic, remarking that, "I think future choreographers
should be very wary of this decision" and "[t]he notion that Martha
Graham did not own the copyright to her work because there was a
corporation set up to facilitate her work is a shocking conclusion."'' 65 Part
of Burstein's disbelief appears to stem from the court's finding that
159. Id.
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)0) (1958); see infra Part V.C.2.
(discussing that being a non-profit does not qualify as being in business under the Supreme
Court's holding in CCNV).
161. See infra Part V.C.2.
162. Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Dance Festival, Inc., Mr. Gerald Arpino and Mr. Gordon
Davidson, In Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 2, Martha Graham Sch. and Dance Found., Inc.
v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-
945 1(L)).
163. Id. at 4.
164. Graham III, 380 F.3d at 640 (concluding that since the statue does not distinguish
between a for-profit and non-profit employer, the issue should be decided by Congress).
165. Joseph Carman, Graham Center Victory; News, DANCE MAGAZINE, Nov. 1, 2002, at
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Graham's arrangement with the Center was an aberration from the norm.166
Rather, the norm is that artists rely on non-profits out of necessity and are
strongly encouraged to do so in order to obtain government funding.
67
Additionally, the Second Circuit's decision appears at odds with the
Supreme Court's holding in CCNV, which did take into account that the
artist's employer was a non-profit.1 68  The court creates a dangerous
precedent by excluding the Center's non-profit status from its work for hire
analysis.' 69  Consequently, this may chill the creations of artists whom
depend on non-profits created exclusively to support their art.
1. Many Artists like Graham Must Rely on Non-Profit Support
Many artists, especially those within genres that are less
commercially motivated and lack an established source of funding, must
become "inextricably tied" to non-profits for their vision to reach an
audience. 170 These artists cannot simply relinquish the non-profit's support
as proposed by the Second Circuit.' 7' The trend of artist reliance on non-
profit support is a result of tax law and the changing landscape of
philanthropy in the United States. 72 Early in her career, when running her
school as a sole proprietorship, financial headaches plagued Graham.
166. Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Dance Festival, Inc., Mr. Gerald Arpino and Mr. Gordon
Davidson, In Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 3, Martha Graham Sch. and Dance Found., Inc.
v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-
9451(L)) citing PETER DOBKIN HALL, Inventing the Nonprofit Sector: 1950-1990, in THE
NATURE OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR (J. Steven Ott, ed., 2001) (finding that where as in 1940
there were only 12,500 tax-exempt non-profits in the United States, fifty years later in 2002, the
number had grown to over 700,000, indicating an undying trend).
167. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Dance Festival, Inc., Mr. Gerald Arpino and
Mr. Gordon Davidson, In Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 3-6, Martha Graham Sch. and
Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir.
2004) (No. 02-9451(L)) (explaining how artists must rely on non-profit support to fund their
projects).
168. CCNV, 490 U.S. at 753.
169. Graham 117, 380 F.3d at 640 (explaining that rather than consider the Center's non-
profit status, the court will conduct its analysis only "under prevailing work-for-hire principles").
170. Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Dance Festival, Inc., Mr. Gerald Arpino and Mr. Gordon
Davidson, In Support of Plaintiff's-Appellants at 3, Martha Graham Sch. and Dance Found., Inc.
v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-
9451(L)) (explaining that there are very few dance companies in the United States which operate
as for-profit entities; the majority are non-profits).
171. Graham III, 380 F.3d at 640 (arguing that if Graham was unhappy with the Center's
control she could have voluntarily severed her ties to the organization).
172. Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Dance Festival, Inc., Mr. Gerald Arpino and Mr. Gordon
Davidson, In Support of Appellants' Petition for Rehearing and, Alternatively, for Rehearing En
Banc at 3, Martha Graham Sch. and Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary
Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-945 1(L)).
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Graham realized that forming a non-profit, rather than relying on the
funding from non-profits, entitled her work to be tax-exempt and eligible
for grants from the government, private foundations, and public charities. 
173
Arguably, in making her decision to sell the school, Graham was not
motivated by a desire to transfer the ownership of her work or have her
work performed at the Center's "instance and expense." Rather, Graham
made her decision under the belief that it would grant her the opportunity to
focus on creating, rather than dealing with the administrative tasks that
come with running a business. Graham was not misguided in this belief
because many organizations that support individual artists allow artists to
retain ownership and control of their art.1
74
2. Ignoring the Center's Non-Profit Status is Contrary to the Supreme
Court's Ruling in CCNV
Applying the Reid factors to Graham's employment, the Second
Circuit chose to gloss over the Center's non-profit status in its analysis.
175
The court's inability to apply the factors with flexibility runs counter to the
Supreme Court's intent, ultimately leading to an incomplete application of
the ruling in CCNV. One of the key agency factors is "whether the
principal is or is not in business., 176 Analyzing this factor in CCNV, the
Supreme Court recognized the significance of non-profit status by
commenting that "CCNV is not a business at all," because it is a tax
exempt non-profit organization. 177 In this simple observation, the Supreme
Court diluted the theory that the distinction between for-profits and non-
profits is frivolous. Rather, it is a viable difference, and it was imperative
to the Supreme Court's conclusion that the sculpture was not a work for
hire. The Supreme Court's direct and deliberate recognition of non-profit
173. Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Dance Festival, Inc., Mr. Gerald Arpino and Mr. Gordon
Davidson, In Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 4, Martha Graham Sch. and Dance Found., Inc.
v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-
9451(L)); see Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 7 n.5, Martha Graham Sch. and Dance Found.,
Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 2d 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(No. 01-9055) (explaining that by getting tax exemption under Section 501(c)(3) of the IRS
Code, public donations and government grants to the school were tax-deductible and tuition was
exempt from revenue tax).
174. Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Dance Festival, Inc., Mr. Gerald Arpino and Mr. Gordon
Davidson, In Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 5, Martha Graham Sch. and Dance Found., Inc.
v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624, (2d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-
9451(L)). For example, the New York Foundation for the Arts makes it clear that the artists it
supports "retain creative control and ownership of their project." Id.
175. See Graham III, 380 F.3d at 641-42.
176. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)6) (1958).
177. CCNV, 490 U.S. at 753.
DUET OF DISCORD
status as being crucial to the work for hire analysis epitomizes the Second
Circuit's gross error in denying its relevance. Accordingly, the Second
Circuit's decision must be scrutinized.
D. Policy Recommendations for Safeguarding Artistic Endeavors
In absence of a successful appeal to the Supreme Court, Congress
should remedy the Second Circuit's errors by adopting the default rule
recommended by ADF, modifying it to apply only to those non-profits
founded to support a specific artist.178 Under this rule, the artist who is also
an employee of a non-profit created to promote his or her creative
endeavors retains the copyright to works created during employment.
1 79
This rule would better protect artists and the intent behind work for hire.
1. The Reid Factor Analysis is Inappropriate for Non-Profits
No two employer-employee relationships are alike; therefore, work
for hire requires a context-specific analysis. Under the 1976 Act, courts
have adopted a fact-driven analysis composed of the thirteen Reid factors.
In its application, a court weighs the various factors based on the specifics
of the case. 80 In theory, this tailor-made approach appears to take into
account the nature of the employment. However, in actuality, this
approach allows courts to pick any of the thirteen factors, thereby giving
them far too much discretion. Although such flexibility may be acceptable
for a for-profit entity, when applied to non-profits the courts can simply
decide to pass over the non-profit status.18 1 Courts should not retain a one-
size-fits-all test because non-profits and for-profits have different goals. In
situations involving non-profits, Congress should set forth a clear rule that
forces courts to consider an organization's non-profit status.
2. Non-Profits are Inadequately Organized to Retain Ownership
Also in support of the ADF's proposed rule is the fact that a majority
of non-profits are unprepared to handle the responsibility of being a
copyright owner. New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer is mistaken to
178. See Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Dance Festival, Inc, Mr. Gerald Arpino and Mr.
Gordon Davidson, In Support of Plaintiff's Appellants at 19, Martha Graham Sch. and Dance
Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004)
(No. 02-9451 (L)).
179. See id.
180. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 861-62 (explaining that the Reid factors are "not intended to be
applied in a mechanistic fashion").
181. See Graham III, 380 F.3d at 639-40.
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believe the public will be best served if Graham's "great achievements can
be perpetuated by the charities she founded."'' 8 2 Many non-profits operate
on a temporary basis because funding often disappears. 183 For example,
financial difficulties plagued the Center and led to an interim end of
operations in 2000.184 Due to its rocky financial past there is a high
probability the Center might be forced to close permanently. If the Center
were to close and retain ownership of Graham's works, most dance
companies would hesitate to endure the risk that comes with staging "a
work in which a copyright is owned by an inactive but still formally
existing" organization.'8 5 The Second Circuit's decision disservices future
audiences because "a defunct or inactive organization ... cannot exploit or
maintain" works the way the artist would have desired.
1 6
If the Center remains active, there is little chance that it can maintain
a staff capable of addressing the copyright issues. Counsel for the Attorney
General even conceded that many non-profits "are not set up to hold and
administer intellectual property."'8 7 Moreover, the lack of funding often
leads to a high turnover rate and an understaffed facility. Practically, the
Center must focus on more pressing day-to-day tasks as opposed to
ensuring the copyright is renewed and free from infringers. Additionally,
with a high turnover rate, new staff members are unfamiliar with the artist's
creative vision and may make decisions that conflict with the artist's
sensibilities. To ensure that the art is preserved for future audiences, the
artist or someone the artist explicitly chooses and trusts, such as an heir,
should retain the copyright rather than a temporary non-profit.
182. Press Release, Office of New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Spitzer Says Court
Ruling Will Preserve Martha Graham Dance Legacy (July 5, 2002), at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/ul/julOSa_02.html.
183. See Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Dance Festival, Inc., Mr. Gerald Arpino and Mr.
Gordon Davidson, In Support of Plaintiff-Appellants at 14-15, Martha Graham Sch. and Dance
Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004)
(No. 02-9451(L)) (discussing the temporary nature of many non-profits).
184. Graham IIl, 380 F.3d at 630.
185. Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Dance Festival, Inc., Mr. Gerald Arpino and Mr. Gordon
Davidson, In Support of Plaintiff-Appellants at 15, Martha Graham Sch. and Dance Found., Inc.
v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-
9451(L)).
186. Id.
187. Brief of Amici Curiae In Support of Appellants' Petition for Rehearing and,
Alternatively, For Rehearing En Banc at 9, Martha Graham Sch, and Dance Found., Inc. v.
Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-945 1(L))
(quoting Ms.Quint, counsel for Attorney General, during oral arguments).
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3. Artists Retaining the Copyright Satisfies the Intent Behind Work for
Hire
The three commonly offered rationales for work for hire support the
artist retaining the copyright. 8 First, work for hire prevents surprise for
those unfamiliar with copyright law. 189 Because the artist's rights as an
employee of a non-profit and the artist's rights as a creator are blurred,
avoiding surprise should be a priority. This could easily be accomplished
by placing the burden on the employer to communicate with the artist about
the ownership of the work, thus protecting the artist, the party with less
bargaining power and potentially less familiarity with copyright law. In
Graham's situation, having a default rule that the artist-rather than the
non-profit, retains the copyright would have avoided the egregious surprise
experienced by Graham's heir. Adopting this rule "weighs in favor of the
untutored artists" forced to rely on the non-profit for support. 190
Second, the doctrine serves the constitutional requirement that the
copyright remain with an "Author." 191  Since non-profits are often
temporary, once a non-profit closes down, it loses its ability to fully
support and maintain the copyright. Therefore, the artist should retain the
copyright to guarantee that the right remains with the person best qualified
to maintain it.
Third and finally, work for hire enhances predictability and certainty
of copyright ownership. 192 The proposed rule would serve this purpose
because it avoids "disrupting settled expectations concerning ownership,"
and allows the creative relationship between the artist and the non-profit to
run smoothly and remain focused on the art. 193  Moreover, this rule's
adaptation would lead to less litigation over ownership issues and provide
the courts with a consistent solution. Congress should adopt a rule
188. Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Dance Festival, Inc., Mr. Gerald Arpino and Mr. Gordon
Davidson, In Support of Plaintiff-Appellants at 14, Martha Graham Sch. and Dance Found., Inc.
v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-
9451(L)).
189. See Brattleboro Publ'g v. Winmill Publ'g Corp., 369 F.2d 565, 567-68 (2d Cir. 1966).
190. Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Dance Festival, Inc., Mr. Gerald Arpino and Mr. Gordon
Davidson, In Support of Plaintiff's Appellants at 14, Martha Graham Sch. and Dance Found., Inc.
v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-
9451(L)).
191. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
192. See CCNV, 490 U.S. at 749.
193. Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Dance Festival, Inc, Mr. Gerald Arpino and Mr. Gordon
Davidson, In Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 14, Martha Graham Sch. and Dance Found., Inc.
v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624 (2d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-
9451(L)).
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allowing artists who create non-profits to retain ownership because the
current system serves neither the needs of artists nor the intentions behind
the work for hire doctrine.
E. Resulting Impact on Artists Who Are Supported by Non-Profits
The Second Circuit's decision may lead choreographers and other
artists to reconsider whether the non-profit support on which they rely will
ultimately rob them of their creations. Therefore, the decision serves as a
wake-up call for artists to prepare adequately for copyright ownership in
the wake of their death. 194  Theoretically, one way to protect their
ownership rights is to explicitly contract for them. Shortly after the Second
Circuit's ruling, Dance NYC, a professional dance organization, posted
boilerplate contracts on its website for choreographers and artistic
directors. 195 These sample documents aid dancers who may be unfamiliar
with how to approach legal drafting. They provide that the artist shall
retain the copyrights to his or her work by stating explicitly that, "the
Parties mutually agree that the Choreography shall not constitute Work
Made for Hire" and "in the event that it should be determined that the
Choreography qualifies as Work Made for Hire, the Company will and
hereby does assign to the Choreographer all right, title and interest.'
196
Further, in the event the artist decides to terminate his or her affiliation
with the organization, the organization retains a non-exclusive right of
performance with continued use to "be negotiated in good faith between the
Company and the Artist or with his assigns or heirs.'
197
Although such a contract might have protected Graham, there is no
guarantee the Center would have signed it. Additionally, Graham should
not carry the burden to seek out a right that she assumed was not in dispute.
The Center's website argues that "dance companies can and do make
arrangements with choreographers establishing that ownership of the
dance(s) created by the choreographer resides with the choreographer."',
98
194. Carman, supra note 165.
195. See, e.g., Dance NYC, Contract Templates, available at
http://www.dancenyc.org/dancers.asp?file=contract (providing sample contracts governing long-
term and short-term relationships, in addition to a sample letter of agreement for arrangements
with a single dance company).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Press Release, Martha Graham Center of Contemporary Dance, Legal Update: August
27, 2002, at http://www.marthagrahamdance.org/us/newsandevents.html (citing choreographer
George Balanchine and others as examples of artists who contracted for ownership to their
dances).
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Even if there were such a contract between the Center and Graham, there is
nothing to prevent the Center from still claiming ownership under work for
hire.
While contracting for ownership may solve disputes in some cases,
the non-profit that willingly enters into such an agreement would likely not
be seeking ownership of the artist's work in the first place. This also places
the artist in a perilous position: if the non-profit refuses to sign this
agreement, should the artist forgo the organization's support? Forcing the
artist to seek out protection is an unnecessary step that circumvents the
greater problem of non-profits claiming ownership of work not belonging
to them while punishing the artist for relying on this support.
VI. THE FINALE - CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit's misapplication of the work for hire doctrine
demonstrates a flawed understanding of Supreme Court precedent and an
ignorance of the current relationship between artists and non-profits.
Besides confusing the issues and the application of the law, this decision
effectively continues a cycle of depriving artists of their right to retain their
copyrights. Artists, like Graham, earn the right to retain ownership of their
copyrights by spending countless hours creating a piece and pushing
themselves to the artistic limit. The Center did not earn copyright to
Graham's pieces by promoting her to Artistic Director and allowing her to
devote more time to create new works. Furthermore, the distinction made
by the Second Circuit between her protected works and unprotected works
spumed by a misapplication of the Reid factors seems arbitrary.
Ultimately, the Center's involvement in Graham's creations, although
helpful, amounted to little more than cheering on the choreographer as she
took her final bow.
To remedy the Second Circuit's wrongs and prevent inconsistent
rulings on this issue, there are two options; either a successful appeal to the
Supreme Court or congressional action. If successfully appealed to the
Supreme Court, it is likely that the Court will reverse the Second Circuit's
decision for ignoring the non-profit status in light of the Court's decision in
CCNV.'99 A congressional act that allows artists to retain their copyrights
when working for non-profits created exclusively for their benefit would
fulfill Graham's desire that the Center "preserve and carry forward her
legacy in dance" rather than place her works in potential copyright
199. CCNV, 490 U.S. at 753.
2005]
498 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:471
limbo. 200 Through either a Supreme Court decision or congressional
action, Graham's wishes and the wishes of future generations of artists who
rely on non-profit funding will be satisfied.
Anne W Braveman*
200. Press Release, Martha Graham Center of Contemporary Dance, Appeal Press Release,
Aug. 18, 2004, at http://www.marthagrahamdance.org/us/newsandevents.shtml.
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